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I 
Communalism and its cognates continue to exercise a vise grip on the 
African intellectual imaginary. Whether the discussion is in ethics or social 
philosophy, in metaphysics or even, on occasion, epistemology, the play of 
communalism, a concept expounded in the next section, is so strong that it is 
difficult to escape its ubiquity. In spite of this, there is little serious analysis 
of the concept and its implications in the contemporary context. Yet, at no 
other time than now can a long-suffering continent use some robust debates 
on its multiple inheritances regarding how to organize life and thought in 
order to deliver a better future for its population. Given the continual resort 
to communalism as, among others, the standard of ethical behavior, the 
blueprint for restoring Africans to wholeness and organizing our social life, 
as well as a template for political reorganization across the continent, one 
cannot overemphasize the importance of contributing some illumination to 
the discourse surrounding the idea. This essay seeks to offer a little 
illumination in this respect. Additionally, it offers a criticism of what all—
proponents and antagonists alike—take to be a defensible version of 
communalism: moderate communalism. I shall be arguing that 
communalism, generally, has a problem with the individual. And the 
African variant of it, mostly subscribed to by the African scholars discussed 
below and defended by them as something either peculiar to or special in 
Africa, has an even harder time accommodating the individual. Yet, as 
history shows, until the modern age in which individualism is the principle 
of social ordering and mode of social living, a situation that privileges the 
individual, above all, various forms of communalism never really accorded 
the individual the recognition and forbearances that we now commonly 
associate with the idea. The strongest variants of moderate communalism 
discussed here have a difficult time taking the individual seriously. I am not 
aware of anyone else ever having made such a case.1 These arguments are 
offered to show that (1) Africa and Africans need to take individualism 
seriously and (2) such have been the historical transformation that our 
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diverse societies have undergone in the course of the last half a millennium 
that the types of communalism that are on offer do not appear to take this 
fact of radical change with the necessary urgency. 
 
II 
Before making the case against African communalism, it is meet to clear 
some conceptual ground.  We can distinguish at least three theses of 
communalism.2 The first, ontological communalism, is a thesis about how 
humans are in the world and what they are. On this reading, being-in-
communion is the natural way of being human. One cannot think of human 
beings in the world without thinking of them in communion\community 
with one another. A human being who is outside of this 
communion\community will, ex definitione, be a non-human. Certainly, it 
is easy to see how one might build some prescriptive theses on this 
foundation but there is no necessary connection between this description 
and a value preference. Many who canvass communalism in the African 
context subscribe to this thesis.3 In fact, many of them are not beyond 
suggesting that this being-in-community is the quintessential way of being 
African, a position scrutinized later in this discussion.4  
The second is the methodological thesis: no matter how humans are in the 
world, we are best placed to make sense of their being-in-the-world and 
their activities attached thereto if we view them through the prism of 
community. This is an explanatory model. On this construal, when we wish 
to explain social phenomena, including human behavior, we should frame 
our explanation in terms of the activities of humans-in-groups and the 
behavior of groups. Those who are familiar with debates in the philosophy 
of the social sciences can easily see the convergence here between what I 
have called methodological communalism and various types of what is 
called methodological holism. The contrast is drawn with methodological 
individualism the many variants of which insist on one core claim: those 
explanations of social phenomena are best which are framed in terms of, or 
ultimately refer to, the understandings, behavior, or activities of named or 
nameable individuals. The best and most sophisticated account of what can 
be considered methodological communalism in the current context is that of 
Akinsola Akiwowo. But he advances it as social theory and as a distinctive 
African-derived explanatory model for social phenomena. Unfortunately, 
African intellectuals, especially those who embrace communalism, do not 
pay any heed to his work. Akiwowo has formulated a sociological theory 
drawn from Yorùbá culture with which to unravel the complexities and 
causes as well as the course of social change in the African context; his 
theory represents an excellent example of methodological communalism.5  
The third, axiological, thesis holds that communalism provides a 
yardstick with which to measure the desirability or worth of being-in-the-
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world. Attention here turns on value theory. Many of the strictures that 
communalists place on contemporary urbanization-inflected social living 
and the atomization that characterizes it are on account of the individualism 
that is inspired, supposedly, by Africans copying Western values. 
Individualist behavior is excoriated and those who embrace it, however it is 
conceived, stand condemned for abandoning a superior mode of social 
living: communalism. In this context, scholars evaluate—as opposed to 
explain, under the methodological version—social phenomena, institutions, 
and practices, including human behavior, in terms of how well or ill they 
reflect, embody, or advance communalism and its tenets. When they reflect 
well, they are good; when not, they are bad. When we apply this to behavior 
and we understand it in terms of answering the question of what we ought 
to do in any given situation, we have the following: that ought to be done 
which advances the well-being of the community, makes the individual a 
better member of the community, and so on. This is axiological communalism.  
If what is to be judged is behavior or conduct, we call it communalist 
ethics. If, however, what is to be judged is the suitability of modes of 
governance or principles of social living or ordering, resolving issues of who 
ought to rule when not all can rule and what end legitimate rule should tend 
to, we call it communalist social and political philosophy or socio-political 
communalism. This will be relevant, let us say, in the design of social 
institutions or what political institutions are most likely to ensure a better 
life for humans. We can easily see how one who thinks that the system is too 
individualist would prefer communalism. In the political arena, one can 
trace much of the preference of African philosophers for one-party regimes 
or consensus politics to this preference for communalist arrangements. They 
may be taken as instances of socio-political communalism.6 We have decided 
to group ethics and social and political philosophy together because both 
relate to assigning, determining, and weighing values of a normative 
character.7 
There might even be a fourth, the epistemological thesis, which might in 
some way coincide with Polycarp Ikuenobe’s defense of what he calls 
“epistemic authoritarianism” founded on deferring to superior wisdom 
modulated by age and collective knowledge.8 
 
III 
The literature on communalism scarcely, if ever, evinces any awareness of 
the distinctions just made. The result is a lot of confusion as to what exactly 
is at issue in these disquisitions. Identifying and distinguishing these 
different theses of communalism can illuminate a discussion that is often 
notorious for its murkiness, as is shown below. 
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Separating these theses is likely to enhance the sophistication of the 
discourse of communalism. For example, the ontological thesis can be 
defended on several grounds, including conceptual and empirical ones. 
Because it is not recognized as such, many who canvass it seem to be 
offering empirical grounds for it. Yet, it is clear that historically it is less true 
of many African societies, especially those that evolved great civilizations.9 
One could also advance communalist ethics but not defend it on empirical 
but ahistorical grounds as is usually done in the literature. What is more, by 
so championing communalism, we can broaden the scope of its desirability 
beyond Africa and, as all philosophical models are wont to do, enfold the 
rest of humanity as a route to a better way of being human-in-society.   
Polycarp Ikuenobe has, arguably, done the most thorough job in recent 
times of clarifying the idea of African communalism. In his Philosophical 
Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions,10 he identifies, 
beyond the standard radical versus moderate standpoints, multiple senses of 
communalism. But even he does not, in the final analysis, escape the 
lumping together of different theses. First, he seems to defend some variant 
of “the African communal tradition.” It is difficult to put this charge more 
directly. Throughout the book, he talks about African culture, tradition, 
traditional society, traditional culture, and so on, sometime in the singular 
and, at the other times, in the plural. He makes clear that if he talks at all 
about anything that resembles a generalization about Africa, it is not a 
descriptive generalization of what communalism is in all African cultures, 
but a conceptual normative generalization. As a conceptual normative 
generalization, I am taking and defending a systematic philosophical 
position regarding how the idea of communalism ought to be understood in 
African cultures. In my analysis, I indicate some of the important features of 
communalism that can be extrapolated from many African traditional ways 
of life. The idea of communalism, in its very broad and pervasive sense, is 
one common or dominant theme or feature in African cultures that emerges 
from the African “way of life.”11   
 Is it possible that, as a construct of Ikuenobe’s imagination, 
communalism does not describe the empirical state of African societies now 
or in the past? Might one derive a different, maybe even opposed, 
“conceptual normative generalization” from the same empirical data 
plumbed by Ikuenobe? Are the commonalities cited as the base for his 
generalization what he has cashed them out to be? Despite all the caveats, 
Ikuenobe’s account still strikes me as just another way of affirming a 
problematic stance: that most of what are styled “traditional African 
societies” were communalist. As I have argued elsewhere,12 the idea of 
“traditional African society\ies” is problematic, to say the least; most likely, 
as a theoretical concept, it is vacuous. For the case can be made that most of 
the commonalities that are often trumpeted as typifying African cultures are 
not peculiarly, predominantly, not to say solely, African. The contrast 
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between the Western and the African is hardly ever illuminating; often they 
obscure and this should not come as a surprise: it frequently is motivated by 
the need to affirm African difference. 
 Africans need to abandon the legacy of colonial-inflected 
anthropology that lumps together several social types that serious study 
should easily make clear do not belong together. How communalistic could 
the medieval Mali Empire have been? Once Islam became the principle of 
legitimacy when it came to governance, how much communalism and how 
“traditional” could such polities be? The Ọ̀yọ́ Empire was a multinational 
polity that had within its borders different national and ethnic groups. On 
what basis could one affirm of 17th century Ọ̀yọ́ with its hierarchies—
including an aristocracy and monarchy that lived off the surplus labor of 
others—and a complex division of labor that it was a so-called “traditional 
society”? Meanwhile, in the various communities that made up Igbo people, 
their scholars and ideologists love to trumpet their traditional preference for 
republicanism and their storied individualism. Yet, scholars love to talk of 
“traditional Igbo society” and affirm communalism of it in the singular. 
Next, Ikuenobe declares that he is “doing a conceptual normative 
analysis of how communalism ought to be understood based on theoretical 
generalization and abstraction.”13 This was his attempt to beat back the 
charge that all such talk was founded on insufficient evidence. Yet, at 
another place, he declares that his “defense of communalism involves a 
critique of the dominant liberal individualistic theoretical and political view 
in the West.”14 Outside of this overarching need to treat the West as a 
monolith in order thereby to affirm Africa in its radical difference, this 
cannot be a very plausible idea unless it can be shown that communalism, 
even of the variety that Ikuenobe defends, is not part of the philosophical 
history of the so-called West. Certainly, given that many of us African 
scholars engaged in this debate are native speakers of the so-called Western 
philosophical idiom, we can assert that we know that not too dissimilar 
versions of communalism are significant parts of “the Western tradition”.  
In a different context, Ikuenobe seeks “to provide a view of 
communalism that is sensitive to the African lived experiences and ways of 
life. In this sense, communalism is of interest to Africa and Africans, in that 
it provides a plausible conceptual and rational basis for explaining the 
reality and experiences in African cultures and perhaps, their own identity 
in the midst of Western culture,”15 which makes it a version of the 
methodological thesis. The only problem is that Ikuenobe does not tell us 
where and how this explanatory model is to be deployed. Is it to be 
deployed by all Africans, per se, or African immigrants in the West? In Asia? 
Or in North America? Or is it also to be used by Africans resident in African 
countries? Does it matter that such Africans are now predominantly 
Christians or Muslims? And what results are we supposed to gain from its 
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deployment? Is this model available for the rest of humanity, a requirement 
it must satisfy to be a good theory?  
Finally, communalism, for him, “involves certain principles regarding 
how a community is organized, the nature of the relationship that must exist 
between these communal principles and individuals, and the responsibilities 
that individuals must meet in order to achieve personhood.”16 Here we have 
a mix of ethical and ontological communalism, the version most often 
advanced in the literature. It is what Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, among 
others, in their different ways, defend. 
The many senses of communalism in Ikuenobe’s discussion show how 
in a single author we can see all three theses represented without any hint 
on the author’s part that anything might be amiss. He does distinguish 
between the political theory of communalism and the other uses to which he 
put the idea in Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in 
African Traditions. Isolating the different theses, as has been done here, will 
show that one can subscribe to one or a combination of the theses without 
subscribing to all of them. Nor is it the case that they all cohere together in a 
tensionless unity and I submit that this awareness is lacking in much of the 
literature on African communalism. Furthermore, it will help if defenders 
like Ikuenobe and Wiredu would essay to show the material or conceptual 
differences between African communalism and other variants that are to be 
found in other cultures and traditions or, minimally, what is particular to the 
African variety.17  
Ultimately, Ikuenobe offers a series of moves designed to show that 
communalism is a breed of African philosophy, instantiated in ethics, 
education, and epistemology. My interest has not been in engaging the 
claims. My interest—and here I may be vulnerable to some of Ikuenobe’s 
strictures on universalism—is in examining whether or not communalism 
offers us a more insightful way of making sense of being human in the 
world. The Africanness of communalism cannot suffice to ground its 
universal desirability; it must have more to recommend it. For if it were to 
aspire to universalizability, then its Africanness cannot serve as a marker 
that many of its defenders claim it is, especially when they distinguish it 
from the individualism they identify with the West. I do not suggest that 
communalism may not be African because it is universal; it can be both. But 
to insist upon it as something especially African requires a more stout and 
sustainable defense. 
 
IV 
The version of examined in this section was originally deployed in the 
anti-colonial struggle and it was designed to provide a template for 
remaking African societies in light of the depredations of colonialism. 
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Additionally, it was a weapon in Africa’s arsenal of ideas against global 
white supremacy that had denied that Africa had any past worthy of note 
outside of its incorporation into European-directed global politics. Thinkers 
in this mode were concerned to answer Europe’s denial with African 
affirmations. It is time to turn to Leopold Sédar Senghor, an ardent 
proponent of socialism. He wanted to show that socialism had antecedents 
in the African past and would therefore be an easier fit than the 
individualism-inflected, capitalism-dominated system imported from 
Europe via colonialism. But Senghor was a much more sophisticated 
thinker, possessed of a more nuanced understanding of intellectual history, 
especially of Euro-American philosophy.  
In his discussion of “the African road to socialism,”18 Senghor was 
concerned to distinguish Africans from Europeans, not Westerners, as a basis 
for extracting what he wished to celebrate as the African genius and how it 
might be deployed in the reconstruction of the African continent in the 
aftermath of slavery, the slave trade, Islamization, Christianization, 
conquest, and colonialism. Of course, Senghor’s discussion unfolded in the 
context of the denial of African achievements by white supremacists in the 
period before and during colonialism. Senghor’s motivations were more of 
the axiological variety.19 He wanted to offer a model of how African societies 
might be rebuilt in the aftermath of the events just mentioned as well as the 
transformations that had occurred as a consequence of Africa’s historical 
engagements with Islam, Christianity and European culture in general. 
But, unlike many who affirm African achievements, Senghor did not 
subscribe to the metaphysics of difference that has informed the view of 
Africa and Africans manufactured by colonial ideologists. On the contrary, 
he was careful to insist that there was nothing peculiarly African about 
communalism and that the task of reconstruction must be an “attempt to 
define an ideal society that will integrate the contributions of European 
socialism with our traditional values. This integration is necessary since our 
society today, in 1960, is neither the Negro-Berber society of the Middle 
Ages nor that of contemporary Europe. Our present society is in fact an 
original one, economically and culturally mixed, with African and European 
contributions.”20 Although it will take us too far afield to expound the issues 
involved, we must not fail to note the historicity that marks Senghor’s 
postulations: note, for instance, the specific references to time and periods—
“today, in 1960”, “Middle Ages”, “contemporary Europe”—represent more 
promising, for theory, temporal horizons than the popular simplistic 
“precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial” periodization that dominates much 
of the discourse of communalism at the present time.  
In addition to the axiological bent of his discussion, Senghor deploys 
the ontological thesis but that is because he wants to show that what he 
proposes, his ultimate philosophical construct, was not completely alien to 
the African context; it did have an African pedigree. After all, he says that 
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the “present society is in fact an original one, economically and culturally 
mixed, with African and European contributions”. Not for him the willful 
erasure of the hybridity of African societies as at the time that he was 
writing or the heterogeneity of the elements that made up the Negro-African 
society he was describing. Hence, his description of what he calls “Negro-
African society” as mixed; it is by no means “purely African”.  
It is also not insignificant that he does not talk about African nature or 
personality, focusing instead on types of society—constructs, if there be 
any—marked indelibly by their historicity and the kinds of persons\beings 
that inhabit them. Rather, his ideal society is better in comparison with 
others precisely because it will combine the best of all the influences that are 
in play in the African situation, both those that are autochthonous and the 
rest that are exogenously derived. The combination will not be African but, 
shall we say, Senghorian. And if it is African at all, it would be so only 
nominally or, at best, a representation of what African genius—human 
genius resident in Africa—has wrought. Needless to say, what would 
recommend it to others will not be its African pedigree or the fact that it 
works for Africans; what will make people want to embrace it is that it 
promises to deliver the best possible society for humans. 
 West African countries and European ones are not different on account 
of the different kinds of humans that live in them. Their difference is 
historical and therefore contingent. The primary difference between West 
African countries and European ones is that the former are “community 
countries where the group holds priority over the individual; they are, 
especially religious countries, unselfish countries, where money is not 
King.”21 Here, again, Senghor speaks in terms not of peoples but of countries 
and societies. The preference for identifying groups by other than 
primordial characteristics or loyalties means that how the groups organize 
their lives and procure their sustenance is more significant than who they are 
as peoples. Countries and societies are more likely to be hetero- than 
homogeneous in their demographic make-up.  
We have, then, a description that contrasts what Senghor calls 
“community countries” with those that are not. Community countries have 
their peculiar features chief among which is the fact that, in them, the group 
is prior to the individual. Here is the contrast fully drawn: 
To return to the distinction between Negro-African and collectivist 
European society, I would say that the latter is an assembly of 
individuals. The collectivist society inevitably places the emphasis 
on the individual, on his original activity and his needs. In this 
respect, the debate between “to each according to his labor” and “to 
each according to his needs” is significant. Negro-African society 
puts more stress on the group than on the individual, more on 
solidarity than on the activity and needs of the individual, more on 
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the communion of persons than on their autonomy. Ours is a 
community society. This does not mean that it ignores the 
individual, or that collectivist society ignores solidarity, but the 
latter bases this solidarity on the activities of individuals, whereas 
the community society bases it on the general activity of the 
group.22 
The difference is one of degree, not of kind. An assembly of individuals and 
a community society are not mutually exclusive; each contains elements of 
the other as subordinate moments of its totality.23 It is just that different 
principles of justification are deployed in each group. Prospering the 
individual and deferring to her dominates in one but not in the other; and 
vice versa. Senghor’s is one of the more sophisticated versions of 
communalism available in the literature. Solidarity in one is marked by 
individual constructions; in the other, it is denominated by how integral 
such instances are to the “general activity of the group.”  
We may understand an “assembly society” as one in which being 
together, by itself, is not salient: each is independent of and primarily 
unconnected to\with the other. Each does her thing, as it were, as she sees 
fit and the main motivation for acting is the advancement of self-interest and 
whatever solidarity may subsist will be contrived, not immanent. 
“Community society”, on the other hand, is characterized by a communion 
in which each is a part and her being a part implies a primary absence of 
autonomy or of its salience. The solidarity of the “community society” is 
immanent to it and the group represents a causal force that can and does act 
upon individuals regardless of their preferences. Yes, there often is 
community among members of an “assembly society” but it is no more than 
an occasional convergence of interests undergirded by negotiation among its 
autonomous members. In a “community society” by contrast, community is 
prior and takes precedence over the individual. In the former case, the 
community must justify itself to the individual; in the latter, the individual 
must justify herself to the community.24  
What sets one apart from the other is the specific configuration of 
individuals and groups. There are no ontological flights of fancy here. 
Needless to say, each characterization is best read as an attempt to capture 
social phenomena and explain how they emerge and\or operate and how 
best to make sense of them. What is at the fore here is that individuals and 
groups form a dialectical whole. It all depends on which moment of each whole 
is dominant at any given time and over the long haul. But by no means will 
it be correct to say, as Wiredu does, that the relationship between the 
individual and the group is symmetrical in either case.25 Each is tilted 
towards the group or the individual, as the case may be. 
Senghor describes the relationship among individuals, their attitudes to 
their group; what the limits are of what each owes the other within the 
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context of their social living; what is and what is not permissible to do to, 
with, and on the body and property of another; and the nature of the 
relationship between the group and the individuals that make it up. There is 
no suggestion here that one form of being is natural to one or the other 
group or that one people are more group-inflected and the other individual-
oriented. There are communities in Africa as there are in Europe; so are 
individuals. 
We see this in Senghor’s consideration of the relationship between the 
community and individuals and how community societies deal with the 
individual: 
Let us guard against believing that the community society ignores 
the person, even if we believe it neglects the individual. The 
individual is, in Europe, the man who distinguishes himself from 
the others and claims his autonomy to affirm himself in his basic 
originality. The member of the community society also claims his 
autonomy to affirm himself as a being. But he feels, he thinks that 
he can develop his potential, his originality, only in and by society, 
in union with all other men—indeed, with all other beings in the 
universe: God, animal, tree, or pebble.26 
The assertion of will confirms the being of the individual but he is shorn of 
the considerations that are due a person. Growing from being and 
developing towards personhood requires deference to the group and its 
preferences. Although the empirical claim that the individual “thinks, feels 
that he can develop” only in and by society strikes me as special pleading, it 
is plausible. We ignore for the moment the undischarged distinction 
between being and person. The assumption here is that a being is not a 
person, without more; the person, on the other hand, is not coeval with the 
individual. Persons are individuals who think, feel that they can develop 
only in and by society. A person in assembly society will be a nonperson in 
community society for the grounds of their respective personhoods differ. 
Personhood in assembly society is based on individuality and in community 
society, on community. This is why in the latter society the individual is 
neglected.27 If the inhabitants of the community society include individuals 
who differ with their fellows in matters of conceptions of the good life and 
how best to realize them, it is obvious that Senghor’s schema has no 
provision for such beings. For one thing, in his schema, they appear to be 
non-persons, given their heterodox beliefs. If this is so, “neglecting the 
individual” is a lot graver phenomenon than Senghor’s discussion might 
lead us to think.28 
We let stand the undischarged distinction between person and 
individual. What follows? It definitely does not follow that the individual in 
“assembly society” does not think that he needs the company of others to 
develop; what he does not grant is that he needs the communion with others 
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to be, or that his needing others makes him inferior to and, therefore, always 
needing to defer to his fellows. It is curious that Senghor appropriates the 
idea of the “person” to the more amorphous metaphysical category of 
“being”. By so doing, he makes it seem as if the “being” of “community 
society” is undifferentiated, unindividuated, and assumed without tension, 
much less conflict. She is just one in a multiplicity of beings, including, as he 
says, “all other beings in the universe”. How this could be construed as a 
serious recognition of the individual in the scheme of things is puzzling. The 
person is only a person in being with others; as a “person” outside this 
organic totality, she is a mere being. The individual is being-without-others, 
a person several notches beneath a real person, on this conception. By 
defining—yes, this is done by definition—the person as the undifferentiated 
being-in-communion, Senghor hopes to persuade his readers that he has 
answered the challenge that the idea of the individual poses to his 
characterization. The challenge, however, cannot be elided that easily.29 
Recognizing a person requires social engagement, boundaries, etc. 
Recognizing an individual is just that: a nominal identity. Hence, the 
comparison to other beings that are apprehended in their individuality and 
mutual indifference; they are inert.  
 
V 
Let us examine this objection to Senghor more fully. Although Senghor did 
not identify communalism as African even though instances of it are to be 
found in the continent, his less careful successors have sought to affirm it as 
a marker of difference between Africa and the rest of the world, especially 
Europe. We can affirm communalism of much of the human race and 
various societies at different times in the past whether in Europe, Asia, 
Africa, or North and South America. But if this is true, then a special case 
needs to be made for the legitimacy of the affirmation and deployment of 
African communalism. The Greeks worshipped mountains, found gods 
everywhere, and insisted that a being-out-of-community must be a god or a 
beast. They also held that the group is prior to the individual. Thus the idea 
of the individual that Senghor puts at the center of assembly society 
historically predated its emergence in the modern epoch, the epoch in which 
“money is king.”  
Aware of the commonalities shared by communalist societies in the 
West, Senghor did not fall into the error of essentializing Europe or Africa; 
he essentializes, if we must say so, agrarian, rural, community society and 
industrialized, urban-based assembly society.30 If this is true, different 
peoples will instantiate different society types, depending on the level of 
development of material and intellectual culture, or the sophistication and 
complexity of the division of labor that is attained by them. Societies sharing 
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the same or similar material and intellectual culture tend to embody 
variations on the same institutional and ideational structures. 
Senghor, too, like the other proponents of communalism identified 
above, mixes different theses of communalism. When he avers, “ours is a 
community society,” he is advancing the ontological thesis; it is his 
description of what African societies are, what typifies them and, perchance, 
sets them apart from other societies. At least, he suggests that a key 
difference between African and European societies  is that the former are 
marked by an organic unity among their members whereas the latter are 
marked by separation. If we could leave his advocacy at this level there 
would not be much to disagree with unless, of course, we have cause to 
argue that he has  incorrectly described the phenomena in question. But 
Senghor thinks, as do others who defend communalism, that given their 
communalist pedigree, African societies are of the type that not only ought 
to be embraced but are indeed of a better order and more likely to redound 
to a better life for humans than their individualist rivals. In so doing, he 
slides into an embrace of the axiological thesis. Because he has not evinced 
any awareness of the different theses that he has lumped together, he ends 
up not providing solid arguments for his preferences.31 
The contrast between Africa and Europe is badly drawn and likely to 
obfuscate rather than illuminate  the nature of societies and the individuals 
that make them up. Have African societies always been “community 
societies” and European societies “collectivist” ones? What Senghor says 
later gives us reason to believe that he recognizes the historicity of the 
phenomena to be explained when he says that the character of West African 
societies has less to do with their being “African” but their being societies 
dominated by a certain mode of producing life and the wherewithal to 
sustain it. Senghor goes to great lengths to show that his defense of 
communalism has to do with the fact that, as of the time he was writing, 
“West African realities are those of underdeveloped countries—peasant 
countries here, cattle countries there—once feudalistic, but traditionally 
classless and with no wage-earning sector.”32  
This implies that communalism’s pedigree is not traced to geography or 
history; rather, it is to be sourced in the modes of production of material life. 
If this is so, communalism is distributed across cultures and peoples who are 
otherwise distinct and different in their cultural productions would share 
communalism insofar as their modes of production are the same or very 
similar. And this, indeed, is what we find in the literature. Communalism is 
widely diffused across the globe from Europe to Asia and the Americas at 
specific historical conjunctures.  
If this be granted, it means that were African countries to begin to 
produce life and maintain it differently, the “community” character that he 
is defending might also disappear or become attenuated with the extinction 
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of the mode of production that had earlier sustained it. As such, those who 
wish to recommend communalism may no longer deploy it as an ontological 
description. They may do so only as an axiological thesis either as ethics, as 
Wiredu does, or as political philosophy. But the justification can no longer 
be on account of its “Africanness”. It must be on account of its desirability, 
primarily, and secondarily, its realizability. That desirability must extend to 
its universalizability. What this means is that, as a historicist, Senghor is not 
really defending communalism; he is recommending it as a caution to 
theorists not to formulate models that do not take account of the situation on 
the ground. He is counseling against the kind of dehistoricized accounts of 
communalism that have come to dominate the discussion since. 
For Senghor, communalism, owing to the underdevelopment of 
material culture in our past societies, could be only one piece of a mixed 
template for social transformation at the present time and, for the future, the 
construction of the best life for humans, whoever or wherever they may be. 
He acknowledges the growing social differentiation in African societies and 
the fact that new templates\theories would have to accommodate these 
realities. He begins this with an acknowledgment that the presupposition of 
a classless society that is one of the fundaments of communalist thinking is 
no longer warranted. Needless to say, this has always been a problematic 
supposition. How one affirms of societies with monarchies and other 
assorted hierarchies that they were without severe social divisions has 
always escaped me. “Starting from this definition of the Negro-African 
community society, we can consider the special questions posed by the existence of 
distinct social groups in our West African society. This comprises three large 
sectors: (1) members of the liberal professions—lawyers, doctors, 
pharmacists, notaries, to whom we may add the merchants; (2) the wage 
earners—government officials, employees, and laborers; and (3) the 
peasants, shepherds, fishermen, and artisans.”33  Even if it was true 
that, when Senghor wrote the original piece, the groups “are less 
differentiated than in European society,” I do not think that anyone would 
suggest that this continues to be the case. If we take seriously Senghor’s 
position that we “consider the special questions posed by the existence of 
distinct social groups,” any discussion of communalism now that does not 
take account of the increasing crystallization of class lines or the growing 
crystallization of social boundaries and indicate how contemporary versions 
of the idea will offset the complications fostered by changed circumstances 
cannot but be inadequate, to say the least. 
Senghor’s recognition of changed and changing circumstances might 
explain some of the other ambiguities in his formulations. His support for 
the fact that the “community society does not ignore the person even if it 
neglects the individual” is that “the member of the community society 
claims his autonomy to affirm himself as a being.” Senghor has performed a 
verbal legerdemain here. It is the society that neglects the individual; this is 
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the basic leitmotif of communalism—the priority of the group to the 
individual. The individual is only a person when he acts and presents 
himself as part of the group. At the point where he asserts himself as an 
individual, one that is independent of the group and whose being is 
understandable outside of the group, he becomes a nonperson. As a person, a 
being, every individual is no different from all the others in the group. To 
that extent, every person, as a being qua being, is infinitely substitutable for 
every other person. 
The individual, on the other hand, and here is the problem, even in the 
most group-inflected setting, is marked by her individuality, something that 
sets her apart from, and renders her unique in the community of, other 
equally distinguished and differentiated individuals. This quality is much 
more than the simple acknowledgment by communalists that their theory 
recognizes individuality. As we just saw, it recognizes only individuality 
that does not deign to move itself away from a group inflection. When 
“community society” neglects this individual, makes her inferior to the 
community, bends her will to the collective preference, or denies her 
personhood, the being concerned has become a plaything, a tool of the 
community. At that point, it matters little what that individual “feels” or 
“thinks” respecting how and where “he can develop his potential, his 
originality.” Simply put, he has not been given the choice; the decision has 
been made for him. He has not, we might say, been taken seriously. He has 
been rendered less than a person.  
For us to believe that the individual is taken seriously there must be no 
prima facie decreeing that the individual must always yield to the group. 
What must happen instead is that the conflict must be acknowledged, not 
elided; and there must be a mechanism for adjudicating the conflict. The 
affirmation of the group interest must be based on good reasoning, not fiat. 
It is this kind of recognition of the legitimacy of individual difference that 
our communalists have not shown matters to them.  
 
VI 
I have argued that communalism is unpromising at the formal or theoretical 
level. At the material level, despite the popularity of communalism among 
African scholars and their repeated recommendation of it as the way out of 
Africa’s contemporary existential funk, I would like to argue that, as a 
Yorùbá proverb says: “As ̣o ̣ kò bá O ̣mo ̣ye ̣ mó ̣; O ̣mo ̣ye ̣ ti rin ìhòhò dó ̣jà.” [The 
clothes came too late for Omoye; Omoye already marched naked into the 
town square.] There is no doubt that communalism enjoys wide appeal 
among African intellectuals. I suspect, though, that a lot of this appeal is 
traceable to the exigencies of embracing anything Western at the 
philosophical level and Africa’s failure to interrogate the legacy of 
colonialist-inflected anthropology in our scholarship. The first makes 
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Africans recoil from considering, much less embracing, individualism, both 
as a principle of social ordering and a mode of social living because we 
mistakenly characterized it as a Western idea. The second inclines Africans 
to the metaphysics of difference manufactured by anthropology from not so 
noble building blocks in the nineteenth century. Due to these twin factors, 
African scholars are forever singing the praise of communal living, the 
virtues of the extended family, how Africans often and easily assume the 
burdens of being one another’s brother’s keeper, taking care of their old—no 
need for old people’s home, thank you—and generally partaking of the gifts 
that “being-with-others” offers.  
So deep is Africa’s attachment to this orientation that we are not beyond 
using communalism as a metric for judging whether an individual can be 
considered a person, a version of ontological communalism.34 I sometimes 
wonder why Africans think that so-called Westerners are human at all given 
the near-synonymy that Africans affirm between communal living and 
being human. Yet, it takes but a cursory look at life as it is led across the 
continent to realize that there is a distinct disjuncture between the cherished 
ideological preferences of African scholars and the reality of everyday living 
for contemporary Africans. The reality is that individualism has been on a 
tear across the African continent for a long time now. The evidence is 
overwhelming. 
Several years ago, I was in a conversation with a Nigerian 
anthropologist colleague who works mostly in what can broadly be 
described as urban anthropology. We were actually surprised by how 
unmindful we had been, up till that point, of the radically changed space 
within which we lived and which formed the physical location of that 
particular exchange: a unit in a 4-flat block built with individual entrances 
that made it possible for neighbors in the same yard not to run into one 
another at their respective entrances beyond a common yard shared by all. 
And this was in Ile-Ife, Nigeria. The spatial arrangement under reference is 
no longer atypical across the continent. So little does our architecture now 
owe to communalism and its associated values that our cities and towns, 
large and small, are devoid, for the most part, of common spaces for the 
unfolding of communal living, for example, public squares and parks. 
The single-family residence is now the dominant, often preferred, 
definitely much sought after, context in which we lead our lives in both 
urban and rural areas. Of course, no thanks to the cleavage between our 
material reality and our warped apprehension of it, we frequently end up 
overwhelming the facilities and conveniences in our residences designed for 
modest use by nuclear families but now overstretched by extended family 
usage. The attainment of single-family residence is now the icon of success 
in our collective imagination; one that is aspired to by lettered and 
unlettered, rural and urban folks alike. And in some perverse way, when we 
elect to accommodate the so-called extended family, in some cases, we 
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relegate them to the “Boys’ Quarters” that our former colonial masters, in 
their vicious racism, reserved for their African servants who were not 
permitted to share the same space with them as a matter of sheer human 
interaction unmediated by the need for the servants’ services! 
Like individuals, African governments, too, are not noted for pursuing 
policies that are designed to enhance Africa’s communalist values and 
enable Africans who so desire to realize their desires for communalist living 
with very low associated transaction costs. Incidentally, most of them are 
run by intellectuals and academics. By contrast, from mortgage deductions 
to deductions for costs of self-improvement, governments in countries 
dominated by individualism make bearable the costs of individualist 
living.35 Such preferences are based on the discourses of their intellectuals 
regarding conceptions of the best life for humans. I do not wish to nor can I 
stop African scholars from canvassing communalism as a model for social 
living and a principle of social ordering in Africa. My contention is that 
much of what is currently on offer represents inadequate justifications and 
less than sophisticated formulations at the theoretical level to serve as useful 
guides for practical life.  
A defense of communalism in today’s context that does not factor in the 
material circumstances of the contemporary situation across the continent 
strikes me as odd, possibly irrelevant. And I contend that our scholars argue 
for and defend communalism at the present time without taking seriously 
where Africa is. The ontological claim respecting how Africans are and how 
they organize themselves is undermined by the reality just described in the 
preceding section. Even if it might be said to reflect the Africa of a long gone 
era, it misapprehends, when it does not ignore or deny, the contemporary 
situation.  
To insert the axiological thesis, say, in the area of politics, is to hanker 
after arrangements that are unlikely to be compatible with the growing 
tendency towards urbanization that is now predicted to have more than 
sixty percent of the African population living in cities and other urban 
agglomerations in the next ten years or so. It is even less plausible when it is 
ethics that is at issue.36 Needless to say, one can canvass any of these senses 
as philosophical exercises and I have no doubt that there will be a lot of light 
shed on many issues by so doing. What I object to is an attempt to win 
approbation by tugging at emotional strings as a kind of feel-good panacea 
to complex realities.  
African scholars reserve the right to offer any prescription they fancy; I 
object because African communalism is completely sundered from the 
reality of the contemporary situation across the continent and in the global 
African world. I can see how the methodological thesis might be fruitful as 
an analytical device for making sense of African phenomena. Finally, it is 
time to jettison our fear of the West and stop trying to wish away our over 
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half a millennium engagement with things Western and our more than two 
hundred years’ tangle with modernity. I would much rather have us take a 
hard look at modernity, come to terms with individualism, and come up 
with models that do not make a short work of it.37 
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